Like Itchy and Scratchy, Oxford and Cambridge, the New York Yankees and the L.A. Lakers (I think), friendly rivalries pepper life with a bit of entertainment and a thrill. You're with them or against them.
Yet I never really thought that actually took place in the philosophy spectrum, or that it was taken as seriously as it seems to be. Perhaps this is due to the fact that throughout my degree and in all my oblivion, my interests were more aligned with the Continental School, with the occasional nod to what is now blatantly identified by this week's readings as the Analytical School of philosophy.
Whilst a healthy sense of competition generally tends to inspire more productivity overall, here it is counterproductive not only to conceptions of philosophy, but also in creating confusion, elitism and obtuseness - completely opposite features to what is needed for propagating the actual importance of philosophy in broader society.
What is interesting here is that the analytical school tends to regard itself as validated by its accepted proximity to the standard scientific method. Research of and analysis of the facts culminating in an overall theory (of semantics, for example) are features which cosy up under the Science Umbrella, and receive the subsequent foundational regard to be an objective viewpoint to be taken seriously.
On the other hand, the continental school relies on its established sense of history as foundational to its credibility. Where one philosopher's influence can be traced back to the other right down to Grandfather Socrates himself, it is this the collective respect, controversy and courage amassed throughout the ages that vindicate the seriousness of philosophy and its relevance, past and present, to humanity itself. However, here the cognitive dimension remains stubbornly subjective.
Yet living in a modernity that seems to teach us 'subjective=emotive=more bad/objective=logical=more good', the continental school is regarded best only by groups that are able to look beyond these limiting dichotomies and substantively appreciate both subjective and objective based content in equal regard as content of human philosophy.
Why, then, are the schools maintaining, if not exacerbating, the dissonance between each other? The overall result seems an unnecessary specification that, were a rose to be one by any other name, could be akin to an industrialisation of philosophy itself. Something jars were we to hear a philosopher comment that he/she works as a 'continental philosophy specialist', or the 'analytical specialist' instead of just 'philosopher', yet this is the same method of specification that refines areas of knowledge into rolling industries, as academic as they may be.
An avoidance of the commodification of philosophy (commodification itself being a popular topic of analysis in contemporary philosophical works) is, if at least as a primary reason, sufficient to get us to consider diminishing the dissonance between the schools.
Yet I never really thought that actually took place in the philosophy spectrum, or that it was taken as seriously as it seems to be. Perhaps this is due to the fact that throughout my degree and in all my oblivion, my interests were more aligned with the Continental School, with the occasional nod to what is now blatantly identified by this week's readings as the Analytical School of philosophy.
Whilst a healthy sense of competition generally tends to inspire more productivity overall, here it is counterproductive not only to conceptions of philosophy, but also in creating confusion, elitism and obtuseness - completely opposite features to what is needed for propagating the actual importance of philosophy in broader society.
What is interesting here is that the analytical school tends to regard itself as validated by its accepted proximity to the standard scientific method. Research of and analysis of the facts culminating in an overall theory (of semantics, for example) are features which cosy up under the Science Umbrella, and receive the subsequent foundational regard to be an objective viewpoint to be taken seriously.
On the other hand, the continental school relies on its established sense of history as foundational to its credibility. Where one philosopher's influence can be traced back to the other right down to Grandfather Socrates himself, it is this the collective respect, controversy and courage amassed throughout the ages that vindicate the seriousness of philosophy and its relevance, past and present, to humanity itself. However, here the cognitive dimension remains stubbornly subjective.
Yet living in a modernity that seems to teach us 'subjective=emotive=more bad/objective=logical=more good', the continental school is regarded best only by groups that are able to look beyond these limiting dichotomies and substantively appreciate both subjective and objective based content in equal regard as content of human philosophy.
Why, then, are the schools maintaining, if not exacerbating, the dissonance between each other? The overall result seems an unnecessary specification that, were a rose to be one by any other name, could be akin to an industrialisation of philosophy itself. Something jars were we to hear a philosopher comment that he/she works as a 'continental philosophy specialist', or the 'analytical specialist' instead of just 'philosopher', yet this is the same method of specification that refines areas of knowledge into rolling industries, as academic as they may be.
An avoidance of the commodification of philosophy (commodification itself being a popular topic of analysis in contemporary philosophical works) is, if at least as a primary reason, sufficient to get us to consider diminishing the dissonance between the schools.
